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GUEST STATUTES:

ANOTHER FAULT WITH NO-FAULT

The concept of no-fault automobile insurance has provoked an
extraordinary amount of heated discussion in the past decade.' Several commentators have suggested that the intensity of emotional
reaction to no-fault is not matched by a corresponding depth of
knowledge on the subject.' Few discussions have considered the
impact of no-fault on the present automobile reparations system in
terms of no-fault's effect on specific legal doctrines. This comment
proposes to examine one such traditional doctrine, the automobile
guest passenger law, in light of existing state no-fault plans.
At first glance, guest laws and no-fault insurance seem to embody similar philosophies. The former are designed to restrict the
applicability of fault standards by immunizing a segment of the
motoring public from the legal consequences of negligence. The
3
latter rejects, in generally pejorative terms, the validity of a faultcentered reparations system.
Despite these surface similarities, guest laws and no-fault insurance are basically incompatible in two key respects. First, all nofault plans contemplate a certain measure of co-existence with a
tort liability system. By excluding severely injured guests from the
complementary benefits of the tort system, guest laws frustrate society's avowed goal of providing to "each person who is injured in a
motor vehicle accident . . . prompt and adequate benefits to compensate and restore each victim . . ."I Second, state no-fault laws
are designed so that a guest passenger is covered by the no-fault
insurance policy of the vehicle owner. Permitting an insured guest
to collect from his "host's" insurer contradicts the policy behind
guest laws. To simultaneously utilize the guest law to prohibit the
guest from collecting full compensation in tort from a negligent host
1. Most recently, attention has focused on apparently unsuccessful attempts by the
94th Congress to pass a national standards no-fault law. S. 354 was voted back to committee-and almost certain death-on March 31, 1976. H.R. 9650 also appears doomed. A concise
history of federal no-fault legislation is presented in S. REP. No. 283, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 17
(1975).
2. P. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS 183 (1972); M. WOODROOF, J. FONSECA & A. SQUILLANTE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND No-FAULT LAW

§§

13.01-02 (1974).

In March of 1971, the Department of Transportation published MOTOR VEHICLE
CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES, a comprehensive investigation of the existing compensation system for automobile accident losses. The DOT conclusion
was unequivocal:
In summary, the existing system ill serves the accident victim, the insuring public and
society. It is inefficient, overly costly, incomplete and slow. It allocates benefits poorly,
discourages rehabilitation and overburdens the courts and the legal system. Id. at 100.
4. S. REP. No. 283, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975).
3.
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produces an internal inconsistency which is difficult for victims to
comprehend.
Fuller examination of the conflicts between no-fault insurance
plans and guest laws must be preceded by some identification of the
two concepts. .
I. GUEST LAWS
While guest laws have suffered severe blows in the past three
years, accounts of their demise must still be regarded as somewhat
exaggerated. The onslaught began when California "took the bit in
its teeth"' in 1973. In the landmark decision of Brown v. Merlo,7 the
Supreme Court of California struck down California's guest statute
as a violation of equal protection clauses in the state and federal
constitutions. In light of Brown's impact on guest law litigation, the
opinion deserves some scrutiny.
The court's conclusion in Brown was that the classifications
imposed by the guest law did not bear a reasonable relation to the
statute's purposes. California's guest law typified most statutes of
its kind in precluding recovery by a nonpaying automobile passenger against the owner or operator of the car where injury resulted
from the latter's ordinary negligence.' According to the court, the
two purposes for this statutory bar were those traditionally offered
as justifications for its existence; i.e., protection of driver hospitality
and prevention of collusive lawsuits against the host's insurer.'
Brown held that the prevalence of liability insurance today under5. More detailed examinations of each concept can be found in the following sources:
Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases-Lots of Them, 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1 (1968); Tipton,
Florida'sAutomobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 287 (1958); Comment, Review of the
Past, Preview of the Future: The Viability of Automobile Guest Statutes, 42 U. CIN. L. REV.
709 (1973); Note, The Present Status of Automobile Guest Statutes, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 659
(1974). R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965); Blum
& Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1964);
Bombaugh, The Department of Transportation'sAuto Insurance Study and Auto Accident
Compensation Reform, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 207 (1971); STATE OF NEW YORK INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE. . . FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? (1970); Hart, National No-Fault Auto
Insurance: The People Need It Now, 21 CATH. U. L. REV. 259 (1972).
6. Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687, 696 (Iowa 1974).
7. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
8. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 (West 1971). The statute was subsequently amended to
apply only to vehicle owners riding as passengers. This version was also found unconstitutional in Schwalbe v. Jones, 14 Cal. 3d 1, 534 P.2d 73, 120 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1975). The
dissenting opinion of Judge Sullivan in Schwalbe, 14 Cal. 3d at 1 n.2, 534 P.2d at 80-81, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 592-93 expressed his disavowance of constitutional analysis used in Brown.
Schwable was vacated at 16 Cal. 3d 514, 546 P.2d 1033, 128 Cal. Rptr. 321. Justice Sullivan's
dissent is now the holding of the court. On rehearing the law was held constitutional.
9. 8 Cal. 3d at 866-78, 506 P.2d at 220-28, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 396-404.
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mined any rational relationship between the prevention of negligence suits and the protection of hospitality. The court stated, in
plain language, there is simply no notion of "ingratitude" in suing
your host's insurer."'
Brown rejected collusion as a valid purpose for the elimination
of tort recovery for guests because, by barring the great majority of
authentic claims along with fraudulent suits, the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad." And, because California had previously
abolished the traditional tort doctrine that a person's status deter2
mines the duty of care owed to him, distinctions between paying
passengers and guest passengers constituted an anomaly within the
general tort law which Brown used as additional evidence of the
guest statute's invalidity.
The court also found the statutory scheme "irrational" as a
practical matter: judicial evasion of the guest statute in cases
where its application would have produced inequitable results had
resulted in an inconsistent case law pattern which made recovery
3
under the statute "largely fortuitous."' As a result of its extensive
analysis, the court refused to find controlling the 1929 decision of
Silver v. Silver, 4 in which the United States Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of Connecticut's guest statute (since repealed).
A major reason for this rejection was the belief that Silver might
the backhave reached a different result had it been "set against ''15
.
...
insurance
liability
universal
.almost
ground of. .
Since the Brown decision, Idaho, Kansas, North Dakota, Ohio,
Michigan, Nevada and New Mexico, have judicially declared their
guest statutes unconstitutional." In five other states, guest laws
were repealed by the legislature. 7 However, Texas, Utah, Delaware,
Iowa, Oregon, Colorado, Nebraska, South Dakota, Arkansas,
Alabama, and Indiana have declined to follow Brown and have
upheld their guest laws against recent constitutional attacks."': At
10. Id. at 868, 506 P. 2d at 221, 106 Cal.Rptr. at 397.
11. Id. at 872-78, 506 P.2d at 224-28, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 400-04.
12. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
13. 8 Cal. 3d at 878, 506 P.2d at 228, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
14. 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
15. 8 Cal. 3d at 863 n.4, 506 P.2d at 218, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
16. Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan.
751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974); Primes v. Tyler,
43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975); Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394
Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975); McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975);
Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial District, 538 P.2d 574 (Nev. 1975).
17. Massachusetts, (1973); Virginia, (1974); Washington, (1974); Colorado, (1975);
Montana, (1975).
18. Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Cannon v. Oviatt, 520
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the present time, fourteen states have laws which forbid guest passenger recovery on ordinary negligence grounds.'"
That eleven state statutes have withstood recent constitutional
attack testifies to the sharp division on the issue of whether liability
insurance has removed the justification for guest laws. 0 Although a
number of jurisdictions which have recently considered guest statute challenges were operational at the time of decision under nofault insurance laws, few discussed the impact of no-fault insurance
on the guest doctrine. As support for the retention of the guest
statute, the Supreme Court of Utah referred to the Utah No-Fault
Insurance Act as a legislative compromise between the conflicting
interests of guests and hosts: "[T]he guest receives limited compensation for injuries, while hospitality is encouraged by not exposing the host to unlimited liability and staggering insurance rates." 2'
In Laakonen v. Eighth JudicialDistrict Court,2 Judge Batjer's concurrence in the invalidation of the guest statute was based solely on
the belief that the Nevada no-fault law, in combination with the
guest statute, operated to produce a subclass of guests unconstitutionally barred from recovering full compensation for their injuries. 3
To understand the basis of this belief, which parallels the concerns
P.2d 883 (Utah 1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 810 (1974), rehearingdenied, 419 U.S.
1060
(1974); Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del. 1974); Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d
687
(Iowa 1974); Duerst v. Limbocker, 525 P.2d 99 (Ore. 1974); Botsch v. Reisdorff, 193 Neb.
165,
226 N.W.2d 121 (1975); Behrns v. Burke, 229 N.W.2d 86 (S.D. 1975); White v. Hughes,
257
Ark. 627, 519 S.W. 2d 70 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805 (1975); Richardson v. Hansen,
527 P.2d 536 (Colo. 1974) (Colorado guest statute subsequently repealed). Beasley v.
Bozeman, 294 Ala. 288, 315 So. 2d 570 (1975); Sidle v. Majors, 341 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. 1976).
19. Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 95 (1958); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-913 to
915 (1947); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 6101 (1974); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT.
Ch. 95
2,, § 10-201 (Smith-Hurd 1971) (amended 1972 to apply
only where guest is hitchhiker);
Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3-3-1, -2 (Bums 1973); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.494
(1966);
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-6191 (Supp. 1976); Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.115
(1975);
South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-801 (1962); South Dakota, S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN.
§§ 32-34-1, -2 (1976); Texas, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 670 lb (1969) (amended
1973 to
apply only to guests related to the owner or operator within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-9-1, -2 (1953); Wyoming, Wvo. STAT.
ANN. §
31-233 (1957). Georgia has a court-created guest law, see Caskey v. Underwood, 89 Ga.
App.
418, 79 S.E.2d 558 (1953).
20. For example, Professors Keeton and O'Connell state that "cases of uninsured drivers are by no means rare." They reason that even if 85 percent of all registered autos
are
covered by liability insurance, 15 percent are uninsured, a not insignificant number given
the
approximately 73 million registered vehicles. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION
FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 65-66 (1965).
21. Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883, 888 (Utah 1974). See also Hale v. Taylor, 192 Neb.
298, 220 N.W.2d 378, 383 (1974) 2d 378, 383 (1974) (McCown, dissenting).
22. 538 P.2d 574 (Nev. 1975).
23. Id. at 579-80.
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outlined previously in this comment, it is necessary to interject an
abbreviated description of no-fault insurance.
II.

No-FAULT INSURANCE

A number of authorities have expressed the view that pinpointing fault is either irrelevant or impossible in many automobile injury cases.2" Few have done so as succinctly as this anonymous poet:
He was right, dead right
As he sped along
But he's just as dead 2
As if he'd been wrong. 5
No-fault insurance speaks to this feeling by attempting to compensate the majority of those injured in motor vehicle accidents for
most of their economic loss without reference to, or requiring proof
of, another's fault in causing the injury. The system of injury compensation in existence where no-fault laws have not yet been enacted combines tort concepts with liability insurance and direct
benefits. It is largely third-party in nature; that is, the insurer pays
benefits to an injured party on behalf of its insured, because of the
insured's tort liability to those injured. No-fault insurance plans are
to
generally first-party systems. The insurer pays benefits directly
26 Under
injured persons because of its contractual duty to do so.
most state plans, however, direct first-party compensation to the
covered victim is limited to a certain amount which cannot fully
recompense seriously injured persons. Therefore, those individuals
with either medical expenses above a statutory "threshold," or with
certain specifically delineated serious injuries,2 are permitted to sue
the alleged wrongdoer under traditional tort concepts. Recoveries in
these instances are not limited, and may be brought for general as
well as actual damages. If the threshold of medical expense or serious injury is not crossed, the at-fault individual is generally immune
24. See, e.g., Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 23 n.17, 271 N.E.2d 592, 606 (1972). But
L. REV.
cf. Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem, 31 U. CI.
641 (1964).
25. Burma Shave (1938), quoted by Davies, In Defense of No-Fault, 21 CATH. U. L. REV.
486, 487 (1972).
26. It should be apparent from this description that health and collision insurance,
which were in use long before the term no-fault was coined, are a species of first-party nothe
fault coverage. For statistics on the prevalence of such coverage, see Eldred, Is No-Fault
Only Answer for the Uncompensated Motorist?, 41 INS. COUNSEL J. 185 (1974); Ring, The
Fault with No-Fault, 49 N.D. LAW. 796 (1974).
27. E.g., fractures, loss of a member, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.
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from tort liability, provided he has obtained no-fault coverage or
2
equivalent security. 1
Present no-fault laws vary, chiefly in threshold amounts, but
most can be fitted into this framework. To that extent, it is fair to
say that no-fault, as we know it, came into existence in 1965.25 In
that year, Professors Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell suggested this structure. 0 The book combined arguments for the new
system with a statutory model suitable for legislative implementation. Five years later, Massachusetts drew heavily on the KeetonO'Connell plan in enacting the first state no-fault law. 3 The Massachusetts plan is a form of what one commentator has termed "partial" no-fault insurance: the law restricts tort liability by means of
the threshold concept discussed above, but it does not abolish tort
recovery altogether*?1 Currently, fifteen states have enacted partial
no-fault insurance laws.33 Another eight jurisdictions have enacted
what the same commentator labels "pseudo" no-fault laws, which
provide for either compulsory or optional no-fault benefits but do
not restrict tort liability in any way.34 Among the twenty-four no28. As a general rule, the tort exemption is rescinded where the accident occurs through
an individual's intentional misconduct. Under some plans, intoxication, criminal activity,
or
intentional conversion of an automobile may also remove immunity. See I. SCHERMER,
AuToMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE, §§ 4.01-.05 (1975).
29. Other important contributions to the no-fault movement are briefly described in
M.
WOODROOF & J. SQUILLANTE, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY 29-36 (1972).
30. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965).
31. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 90, § 34A-O, as amended, (Supp. 1975).
32. For a more detailed discussion of the Massachusetts plan, see Kenney & McCarthy,
"No-Fault" in Massachusetts, Chapter 670, Acts of 1970 - A Synopsis and Analysis, 55
MASS.
L. Q. 23 (1970).
33. Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-4-701 to -723 (1973); Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-319 to -351(a) (Supp. 1976); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.730
to 741 (West 1972); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3401b to -3413b (Supp. 1976); Hawaii, HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 294-1 to -16 (Supp. 1975); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3101 to -3121 (Supp.
1975); Kentucky, 1974 Ky. Acts 752, ch. 385; Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
90,
§§ 34A-O, as amended, (Supp. 1975); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65B.41-.70 (Supp.
1976); Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 698.010-.510 (1975); New Jersey; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§
39:6A-1 to -20 (1973); New York, N.Y. INSUR. LAW. § 670-77 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76);
North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26-41-01 to -19 (Supp. 1975); Pennsylvania, PA.
STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, 99 1009.101 to .701 (Purdon Supp. 1975-76); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-41-1
to -22, as amended (Supp. 1975).
In its 1976 term, the Florida legislature passed amendments repealing the current nofault provisions allowing pain and suffering suits of medical expenses exceeding $1000.
Under
the amendments, suits are allowed only for permanent injury or for serious non-permanent
injury significantly hampering normal activity for ninety days after the accident and leaving
demonstrable effects at the end of that time. 1976 FLA. SESS. LAW SERV. 756-57, ch.
76-266,
amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737 (1972). Illinois' partial no-fault law was declared unconstitutional in Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d.478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
34. Arkansas (optional), ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4014 to 4021 (Supp. 1975); Delaware,
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fault jurisdictions, Michigan comes the closest to having a "pure"
no-fault plan. :" Tort liability for accidents involving insured vehicles is abolished, except for intentionally caused injury, general
damages resulting from specific severe injuries, and actual damages
in excess of policy limits. Correspondingly, the law provides for
unlimited direct compensation for all reasonable medical expenses
and a high level of benefits for other categories of economic loss.
For the purposes of this discussion, one of the most significant
aspects of state no-fault laws is the fact that permissive occupants
of the insured vehicle are generally covered by the vehicle owner's
insurance. However, some state laws exclude a passenger from the
owner's coverage if the passenger carries or is required to carry his
own no-fault insurance, or is a member of a household which carries
or is required to carry no-fault insurance." Others specify that primary coverage is that of the insured vehicle, and allow inter-insurer
subrogation to correct any duplication." The other significant element of existing no-fault laws is their dependency on tort recovery
to completely compensate the severely injured accident victim.
With the exception of Michigan, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, in
most states, mandatory no-fault minimums are too low to do more
3
than begin to cover major accident expenses. Table I provides a
§ 2118 (Supp. 1975); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 538-47
(Supp. 1975); Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 743.786 to .792 (1975); South Carolina, S.C. CODE
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21,

ANN. §§ 46-750.101 to .154 (Supp. 1975); South Dakota (optional); 1971 S.D. SEss. LAWS 325,
ch. 270; Texas (optional), Thx. INS. CODE art. 5.06-3 (Vernon Supp. 1974-75); Virginia (optional), VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.1-380.1 to .2 (Supp. 1975). Nine no-fault acts have withstood
constitutional challenges: Massachusetts, Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971);
Florida, Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 S.2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (specific-injury thresholds
declared unconstitutional); Kansas, Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974);
2d 1291 (1974); Michigan, Shavers v. Kelly, 65 Mich. App. 355, 237 N.W.2d 325 (1975);
Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich. 441, 208 N.W.2d 469 (1973)
(property damages provision held unconstitutional in Shavers); Connecticut, Gentile v. Alter8904 (Aug. 5, 1975), appeal dismissed, 96 S.Ct. 763 (1976);
matt, CCH AUTO. L. RPrR.
Pennsylvania, Singer v. Sheppard, 347 A.2d 897, CCH AUTO. L. RPTR. 8766 (1975); Kentucky, Fann v. McGuffey, CCH AUTO L. RPTR. 8779 (June 27, 1975); New York, Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975). See also Opinion of
the Justices, 304 A.2d 881 (N.H. 1973) (holding constitutional a no-fault bill which the
legislature subsequently failed to enact); and 1973 Op. N.M. Arr'y GEN. 73-33 (March 28,

1973), (advising the Governor that New Mexico no-fault legislation was unconstitutional).
35. MICH. CoMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 500.3101 to .3179 (Supp. 1976-77). The labels "partial,"
"pseudo," and "pure" are those used in P. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS 192-98 (1972).

36. E.g., Connecticut.
37. E.g., Colorado. A variation on this is exemplified by Massachusetts' and Hawaii's
no-fault laws, which provide that primary no-fault insurance is that of the vehicle which the
victim was occupying at the time of the accident, but state that no person can recover basic
no-fault benefits from more than one insurer.

38.

Keeton and O'Connell pose these questions: Can we afford to have no-fault benefits

cover all out-of-pocket loss? Should we force on all victims the bargain of assured and rela-
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listing of individual covered and coverage limits, under the twentyfour existing state no-fault plans.
III.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NO-FAULT/GUEST LAW CONFLICTS

Eight states currently operate under both no-fault insurance
and a guest law. Five of these states-Arkansas, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, and Texas-have pseudo no-fault laws.
Delaware, Georgia, and Utah have partial no-fault laws which involve some restrictions on tort liability. Table II shows the extent
of these restrictions.
The fact that only eight states suffer from the combined effects
of no-fault insurance and guest laws arguably minimizes the
problem. Passage of a national no-fault law, however, must be
viewed as a likely prospect for the near future.39 Unless the other six
guest law states abolish their guest statutes in the interim, no-fault
insurance and guest laws may co-exist in fourteen states, or almost
a third of the country. Given the interstate character of automobile
travel,4 0 the issue of guest law conflict is a significant one in terms
of uniform implementation of any national no-fault standards. As
one report on guest laws, presented during 1971 Congressional hearings on a federal no-fault bill, stated:
The present fragmented, "crazy-quilt" design of reparations rules
under the fault system should [not] be perpetuated. . . . On the
contrary, it is clear that State's [sic] reparations systems must contain a basic compatibility built around the theme of universal nofault compensation of accident victims."1
IV.

WHAT HAPPENS TO THE GUEST UNDER NO-FAULT?

A.

PracticalConsequences
The basic principles of no-fault/guest law conflict can be stated
as follows.
tively full compensation for out-of-pocket loss at the price of abandoning all tort claims?; they
answer them negatively. Keeton and O'Connell, Alternative Paths Toward No-FaultAutomobile Insurance, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 241, 246-50 (1971).
39. The most recently defeated federal bill contained national no-fault standards which
would have required uniform implementation within three years of a no-fault law similar to
Michigan's. For a sophisticated analysis of the constitutionality of a federal no-fault insurance law, see Note, Is Federalism Dead? A ConstitutionalAnalysis of the Federal No-Fault
Automobile Insurance Bill: S. 354, 12 HARv. J. LEGIS. 668 (1975).
40. On the conflict of laws problem, see Kozyris, No-Fault Automobile Insurance and
the Conflict of Laws - Cutting the Gordian Knot Home-Style, 1972 DUKE L. J. 331, 390.
41. Hearings on Bills Relating to No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1971).
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In jurisdictions where guest laws exist, a guest passenger with
minor injuries inflicted as a result of his host's negligence benefits
significantlyfrom the enactment of a typical no-fault insurance law.
When economic loss resulting from injuries is fully compensated by no-fault benefits, the fact that the injured guest is barred
from suing a negligent host becomes immaterial. Guests and paying
passengers with non-severe injuries or medical expenses below
threshold units are both foreclosed from recovering for pain and
suffering under no-fault laws, so the enactment of a no-fault law also
serves to equalize recovery between guests and paying passengers
with minor injuries.
In jurisdictions where guest laws exist, a guest passenger with
major injuries inflicted as a result of his host's negligence does not
significantly benefit from the enactment of a typical no-fault insurance law.42
The typical no-fault law, currently existing in fifteen states, is
a partial no-fault plan based on the Keeton-O'Connell model. The
Keeton-O'Connell framework, with its relatively low minimum coverage, was designed to preserve negligence claims "when the
amounts involved are large enough to justify the cost of trying to
3
assign fault and to value pain and suffering." Because tort recovery
is barred by the guest law, however, a guest passenger with major
injuries cannot pursue a negligence claim, and will not be fully
compensated in a no-fault/guest law state. Hence, the enactment of
a typical no-fault insurance law does not erase the disparity in recovery between guest passengers with major injuries and paying
passengers suffering the same degree of injury.
A typical car-pool situation can be used to illustrate the practical consequences stemming from the addition of guest-law protection to the factors which control the extent of financial recovery for
automobile injury. The commonplace nature of the model demonstrates the significant position occupied by guest laws in the present
compensation system."
42. Keeton and O'Connell concede that their plan is directed towards the "small
claim:" economic loss of $10,000 or less. They contend that the severely injured nevertheless
benefit from no-fault to the extent that its benefits are paid immediately and by virtue of
the removal of small claims from presently congested court dockets. The latter benefit, of
course, is meaningless to guests with negligence claims. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, AFrER
CARS CRASH: THE NEED FOR LEGAL AND INsURANcE REFORM 71-73 (1967).

43. Id. at 71-72.
44. Canadian statistics indicate that one-third of those killed or accidently injured by
automobile accidents in that country are guest passengers. Gibson, Guest Passenger
Discrimination,6 ALBERTA L. REV. 211 (1968). United States statistics show that of all those
injured in motor vehicle accidents in 1974, roughly 196,200 suffered permanent impairment
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Plaintiff and defendant drove to school together each weekday
morning with a regular group of fellow students. Each week, a different member of the group drove his car and picked up the others. No
payment was made to the person driving; even gasoline expenses were
borne solely by the driver.
On the day of the collision, defendant picked up plaintiff. En
route to the home of another member of the pool, defendant missed
a turn at an intersection and collided with a telephone pole. Plaintiff
suffered multiple lacerations including a bad facial cut which healed
in a jagged scar, fractures of both legs, her right arm and her left
ankle. One doctor assesses her post-accident condition as a thirty
percent permanent disability. Plaintiff's medical expenses exceed
$16,000. She lost approximately $3,000 in part-time income, as she
was unable to work for about a year. Pain and suffering, including
humiliation caused by the facial scar can be conservatively estimated
at $50,000.
Defendant's personal financial resources are negligible."

Assuming that defendant carries liability insurance in whatever
amount is made compulsory under state law; that defendant and
plaintiff both carry the mandatory amount of no-fault coverage required by state law; and that defendant's driving was negligent, but
not willful or wanton; Table III shows the compensation available
to plaintiff in the eight no-fault/guest law states.
Although many state no-fault laws are tied to compulsory liability insurance provisions, Table III suggests how empty this promise of financial responsibility is for guests. Those individuals with
sufficient resources" can, of course, avail themselves of opportunities to buy additional insurance coverage in order to assure adequate
compensation for even catastrophic injuries. To make ability to
afford extra premiums the determinant of adequate compensation,
however, suggests the possibility of discrimination on the basis of
or death. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 962 (1976). Using these figures, the number
of
guests severely injured or killed in 1974 was at least 65,400. This number does not include
those whose injuries resulted in large medical bills without permanent impairment.
45. The model was suggested by the court in Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331
N.E.2d 723 (1975); and Behrns v. Burke, 229 N.W.2d 86 (S.D. 1975). The plaintiff in Behrns
suffered the injuries described but was unable to collect a penny from the defendant,
her
sister, since South Dakota upheld the guest statute. The fact pattern is such that plaintiff's
injuries meet both monetary and specific-injury thresholds under most state no-fault laws.
While logic suggests that this will often occur, for a discussion of where it does not see Lasky
v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 25-26 (Fla. 1974) (Ervin, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part).
46. In Grace v. Howlett, 1972 INSUR. L. J. 59, 60, aff'd, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474
(1972), an Illinois Circuit Court in Chicago cited statistics showing that 82.4 percent of lowincome blacks in the city of Chicago were uninsured, where Illinois law did not make liability
insurance compulsory.
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wealth. 47 Abolition of guest statutes is the only sure method of placing severely injured guests on an equal footing with non-guests suffering similar injuries. Retention of the guest law in a state with nofault insurance, as the concurring opinion in Laakonen realized,
arbitrarily divides the class of guest passengers into two subclasses:
those guests who are able to recover full compensation for their
actual accident expenses, and those who are not. The number of
unrecompensed guest victims obviously shrinks in proportion to the
amount of direct coverage provided by the no-fault policy. But,
since only six states-New Jersey, Michigan, New York, Colorado,
Minnesota, and Pennsylvania-provide direct coverage above
$15,000, any extended recuperation period imposes a serious financial burden for the guest in most no-fault states.
Moreover, state no-fault laws create a further subdivision between guests who fully recover actual expenses from their hosts' nofault insurers, where the host bears any subsequent premium
increase, and guests who fully recover actual expenses from their
own no-fault insurers but carry the burden of raised premiums.
Under some no-fault laws,4" the guest recovers from the host's insurer if he is not covered by his own no-fault policy and is not required to have such coverage. Since no-fault laws require coverage
only for automobile owners, guests who neither own automobiles
(nor reside in households that do) comprise a distinct subclass of
guests who may receive full compensation for the actual expenses
of minor injuries from their hosts' insurers' A few Florida cases have
carved out still another subdivision by permitting minor guests to
recover from their hosts' insurers despite the fact that the minors
were members of households which owned cars but had failed to
4
procure required no-fault coverage. " Further stratifications are no
doubt possible. Each subclassification makes more arbitrary the
plight of the guest who must cope with both uncompensated expenses and sky-rocketing premiums.
47. The United States Supreme Court has stated that wealth discrimination alone does
not constitute a suspect classification, so as to expose legislation to strict constitutional
scrutiny. However, where the class discriminated against as completely unable to pay for
some desired benefit because of its impecunity and as a consequence sustained the absolute
deprivation complained of it may be found to occasion de facto discrimination and will be
invalidated on that ground. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1, 21-22 (1973).
48. E.g., that of Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-913 to -15 (1947).
8728 (Fla.
49. Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Williams, CCH AuTo. L. Rra.
App. March 20, 1975); Farley v. Gateway Insurance Co., 302 So. 2d 177 (Fla. App. 1974);
Gateway Insurance Co. v. Butler, 293 So. 2d 738 (Fla. App. 1974).
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B.

Underlying Irrationalities
The preceding section indicated the practical inequities produced by confining a severely injured victim to state no-fault benefits, and barring him under guest laws from the supplemental tort
recovery available to paying passengers. Of course, as the Utah
Supreme Court in Cannon v. Oviatt pointed out, even severely injured guests are indisputably better off under a combination of nofault insurance and guest laws than under guest laws alone. But
what public policy is served by allowing guest laws to co-exist with
no-fault laws? The traditional reasons for the existence of guest laws
are vitiated by the enactment of no-fault laws.
Where no-fault insurance laws permit the guest to collect from
his host's insurer, the theory of protecting driver hospitality no
longer has validity as a justification for guest laws. The possibility
that the host may be required to foot the bill for increased premiums
resulting from compensation for the guest's injury destroys, to that
extent, his insulation from responsibility for the guest's well-being.
Where the guest collects from his own insurer, the rationale of protecting driver hospitality is equally unpersuasive. To permit recovery without regard to anyone's fault up to a certain point, and then
implement a standard requiring the guest to show willful or wanton
misconduct if he seeks further compensation, creates a system that
bears no relation to the host's decision as to whether or not to offer
a ride. To assume that a driver will, in effect, determine that his
conduct is not likely to cause injuries beyond the no-fault threshold,
and base hospitality decisions on that determination, is to suggest
an impossibly precise delineation. As the court in Brown observed,
"reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct depending
on such matters."50 The hospitable impulse is not modified by considerations of the degree of injury likely to result from negligent
operation of the vehicle; it is modified, if at all, only by considerations of whether or not any injury is possible. As far as the guest is
concerned, it is illogical to allow recovery up to a certain
amount-whether from his own insurer or his host's-and then to
cut it off entirely unless gross misbehavior can be proved. 5'
Allowing guests with minor injuries to recover from their hosts'
50. 8 Cal. 3d at 870, 506 P.2d at 222-23, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 398-99, quoting from Rowland
v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968).
51. This point has been recognized by other commentators. See, Note, The Present
Status of Automobile Guest Statutes, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 659, 684-86 (1974); Note, The
Future of the Automobile Guest Statute, 45 TEMP. L. Q. 432, 444-47 (1972); Smith, Duty
Owed to Guest Occupants in Motor Vehicles, 57 MASS. L. Q. 59, 61 (1972).
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insurer suggests the specious nature of the collusion rationale once
no-fault laws are enacted. It is just as feasible, and probably easier,
to pad medical expenses as it is to collude on the question of negligence. In fact, instances of the former activity have been documented,5" while those of the latter are rare.53 Yet the fear of one type
of fraud is considered sufficient reason to exclude severely injured
guests from complete compensation, while fear of the other type has
not prevented complete coverage of guests with less severe injuries.
Finally, if one of the purposes of the guest law is to foreclose
vexatious litigation," this purpose is adequately served by no-fault's
tort restrictions and hence cannot justify continued existence of
guest laws in no-fault jurisdictions.
V.

CONCLUSION

To the extent that a no-fault plan is designed to operate in
tandem with tort liability, and not in lieu of it, a guest law cuts
down on the efficiency of the total reparations system. If this effect
was justifiable in terms of sound public policy, the co-existence of
guest statutes and no-fault insurance would be defensible. But, as
has been indicated, no-fault's presence vitiates the traditional justifications for the existence of guest laws. The rise of no-fault should
therefore, logically coincide with the guest law's fall.
General dissatisfaction with traditional methods of coping with
highway carnage is reflected in the public's apparent desire for
changes in the automobile "injury industry."55 As one commentator
has observed, "It may take several years of ambiguity, inconsistency, and unfairness before the individual state[s] . . . fully realize the extent of the conflict between the guest statute and the spirit
of no-fault insurance."56 But, until legal and insurance approaches
are harmonized, efficient and comprehensive injury compensation
will never be realized.
Terry Miller
52. 122 CONG. REC. 4627 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1976) (remarks of Senator Durken during
debate on S. 354).
53. See Gibson, Guest PassengerDiscrimination,6 ALBERTA L. REV. 211, 215-16 (1968);
Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases - Lots of Them, 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1, 21 (1968).
54. See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122-24 (1929).
55. M. WOODROOF, J. FONSECA & A. SQUILLANTE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND No-FAULT
LAW §§ 13.1-.20 (1974).
56. Note, The Present Status of Automobile Guest Statutes, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 659,
686 (1974).
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MEDICAL EXPENSES*
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I

WAGE Loss*

ARE GUEST PASSENGERS COVERED
BY VEHICLE OWNER'S POLICY?

$2,000

70% up to $140
wkly for 52 wks

Yes, unless guests are covered by
their own or another's no-fault
insurance policy.

Colorado

$25,000

up to $125 wkly
for 52 wks

Yes, primary coverage is that of
vehicle owner.

Connecticut

$5,000 limit on all expenses

Arkansas
(optional)

Delaware

$10,000 limit on all expenses

Yes, unless guests are the owners
of vehicles for which no-fault
is required.
Yes, interinsurer subrogation is
allowed to correct duplication.

Florida

$5,000 limit on all expenses

Yes, unless guests are owners
of vehicles subject to act or
entitled to benefits from the
insurer of a vehicle owner.

Georgia

$5,000 limit on all expenses

Hawaii

Yes, amount of basic benefits
cannot exceed $5,000.

$15,000 limit on all expenses

Yes, primary coverage is that of
vehicle owner - no person can
recover no-fault benefits from
more than one insurer as result
of same accident.

Kansas

$2,000

Yes, interinsurer subrogation
is allowed to correct duplication.

Kentucky
(optionalif tort recovery
limitation
rejected, nofault benefits
are not payable)

up to $650 a
month for 1 yr
$10,000 limit on all expenses

Maryland

$2,500 limit on all expenses

Massachusetts

$2,000 limit on all expenses

Yes, primary coverage is that of
vehicle owner. If owner's insurer
fails to pay, guest's insurer has
right of reimbursement.

Yes, primary coverage is that of
vehicle owner - no person can
recover basic benefits from more
than one insurer.
Yes, primary coverage is that of
vehicle owner - no person can recover no-fault benefits from more
than one insurer as result of same
accident.

* For the sake of simplicity, and to dovetail with the factual model only these two areas
of no-fault recovery are illustrated. Replacement services and survivors' loss are also provided
for under most plans.
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STATE

MEDICAL EXPENSES*

WAGE LOSS*

ARE GUEST PASSENGERS COVERED
BY VEHICLE OWNER'S POLICY?

Michigan

Unlimited

up to $1,000
a mornth

Yes, primary coverage is that of
vehicle owner - limit upon the
amount of no-fault benefits available is to be determined without
regard to number of policies
applicable to same accident.

Minnesota

$20,000

85% up to
$200 wkly

Yes, but if guest has no-fault
insurance, his own policy is
primary.

Nevada

$10,000 limit on all explenses

Yes, but if guest has no-fault
insurance, his own policy is
primary.

New Jersey

Unlimited

Yes, maximum recovery limits
are those of one policy, but no
definite provisions re duplication.

New York

$50,000 limit on all expenses

North
Dakota

up to $100 wkly
for up to 1 yr

$15,000 limit on all expenses

Yes, maximum recovery limits
are those of one policy, but no
definite provisions re duplication.
Yes, primary coverage is that of
vehicle owner.

Oregon

$5,000

70% up to
$750 monthly

Yes, primary coverage is that of
vehicle owner - not subject to
reduction by other insurance
benefits.

Pennsylvania

Unlimited

up to $15,000
maximum figured
on basis of
state's percapita income

Yes, provided guest is not covered
by his own or another insurance
policy.

South
Carolina

$1,000 limit on all expenses

Yes, primary coverage is that of
vehicle owner, and no duplication is allowed.

South
Dakota
(optional)

$2,000

Yes, no definite provisions re
duplication.

Texas
(optional)

$2,500 limit on all expenses

$60 wkly,
starting 14
days after
injury, up
to 52 wks

Yes, amount of basic benefits
cannot be exceeded.
*For the sake of simplicity, and to dovetail with the factual model only these two areas of
no-fault recovery are illustrated. Replacement services and survivors' loss are also provided
for under most plans.
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Virginia
(optional)
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$2,000

851 up to $150
wkly for up to
52 wks

Yes, primary coverage is that of
vehicle owner - no definite
provisions re duplication.

$2,000

$100 wkly
for up to
52 wks

Yes, no specific priority
provisions.

TABLE II
STATE

RESTRICTIONS ON TORT LIABILITY

Delaware

None, but if an accident victim seeks to recover general damages,
he cannot submit as evidence the amount of no-fault benefits
for which he was eligible.

Georgia

Tort liability for general damages is abrogated except where
injury results in death, bone fracture, permanent injury or
disfigurement, disability for at least ten days, or medical
expenses in excess of $500. Tort liability for actual damages is
abrogated unless maximum no-fault limits are exhausted.
No action for general damages can be maintained unless
medical expenses exceed $500 or accident results in dismemberment or fracture, permanent disfigurement, permanent disability, or death.

Utah
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TABLE III

WHAT NON-GUEST
COULD RECOVER
ECONOMIC
STATE

Loss

PAIN &
SUFFERING

LIABILITY

No-FAULT

RECOVERY

-JUDGMENT*

INSURANCE+

Arkansas'
(optional)

$16,000
3,000
$19,000

$50,000

$ 2,000 Medical
2,100 Wages
$ 4,100 Total

$69,000

If named insured
rejects no-fault,
not required

Delaware 2

$19,000

$50,000

$10,000 Total

$69,000

$25,000

Georgia'

$19,000

$50,000

$ 5,000 Total

$69,000

$10,000

Oregon'

$19,000

$50,000

$ 5,000 Medical
$ 2,100 Wages
$ 7,100 Total

$69,000

Not compulsory.
If it is issued,
must include
no-fault

South
Carolina'

$19,000

$50,000

$ 1,000 Total

$69,000

$10,000

South
Dakota
(optional)

$19,000

$50,000

$ 2,000 Medical
$ 3,000 Wages
$ 5,000 Total

$69,000

Not
compulsory

Texas'
(optional)

$19,000

$50,000

$ 2,500 Total

$69,000

Not

Utah'

$19,000

$50,000

$ 2,000 Medical
$ 2,550 Wages
$ 4,550 Total

compulsory
$69,000

$15,000

*This represents the potential recovery in tort, plus no-fault benefits unless otherwise
indicated.
+This represents assured recovery.
'If accident victim who receives any first-party benefits later recovers in tort from at-fault
person, insurer has right of reimbursement to that extent.
'Insured cannot plead or prove no-fault benefits as evidence in tort action. Insurer has
right of subrogation to insured's rights, presumably including tort suit.
3

Interinsurer subrogation allowed between victim's insurer and at-fault's insurer.

'Benefits paid for first-party coverage reduce amount of damages.
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